The fur trade, which usually brought wholesale destruction to furbearing animals, was competitive, hence without regard for conservation. It demanded the continuous opening of new productive areas, which drive the trader westward. The Missouri, the Saskatchewan, and after 1811, the Athabaska rivers, were his highways to the Pacific Northwest. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the trade was looking for outlets on the Pacific.
Between 1807 and 1813, the North West Company established its hold in the Pacific Northwest. The HBC challenged the Nor'Westers in the Saskatchewan and Athabaskan plains, but only once attempted to invade the Rockies. In the spring of 1810 Joseph Howse, with a party of seventeen, crossed over the pass used by David Thompson, followed Thompson's trail to Flathead Lake, and built a trading house near the present Kalispell, Montana. Trade was good, but Howse advised against further expeditions because of Indian troubles. The Nor'Westers interpreted Howse's venture as evidence of their rival's intention to expand into the Rockies. For this and other reasons they petitioned the Board of Trade and Privy Council to restrict HBC to its chartered lands and to grant their own company exclusive trade on the coast between 42 and 60 degrees.
As we have seen, the Nor'Westers were also threatened on the Upper Missouri. A more serious threat emerged in the ambitious plans of a competitor with whom they had had long experience in Wisconsin.
John Jacob Astor was a man of entrepreneurial talent.1 Originally from Germany, he had emigrated to New York via London in 1784. Twenty years later he was the foremost fur dealer and one of the most successful merchants in New York. His career illustrates a capacity for large-scale planning and patient execution and fine dexterity in manipulating situations to serve his own interests. the Louisiana Territory encouraged plans for enlarging those interests. The blueprint for his ambitions projected a chain of trading houses between St. Louis and the mouth of the Columbia River; the establishment of posts at strategic locations throughout the interior of the Pacific Northwest; and a fleet to carry on Pacific coastal trade with the natives, supply Russian settlements, and connect with his already flourishing New York-Canton trade. This plan required that he eliminate competitors, or temporarily cooperate with them, whichever would soonest win him control of the American industry.
Astor incorporated the American Fur Company in 1808, but it lay dormant while he set up subsidiary, or regional, companies. For more than a decade he had dealt amicably with Montreal merchants prominent in the North West Company. Occasionally, he bought from them furs and British goods which Indians preferred to those of American manufacture, and sometimes he carried Canadian furs to the China market. These mutually agreeable relations continued even when his traders were vigorously competing with the North West Company's men, and in spite of the suspicions of the Montreal merchants that Astor's interests were not wholly compatible with their own.
The Canadians found it especially advantageous to work with Astor in the Great Lakes area; through him, they could avoid United States regulations which applied to foreigners. Their relationship was formalized in a partnership when the South West Company was organized in January 1811.
What made the new company acceptable to the North West Company was a firm agreement that Astor's men would not intrude in the trade of the Upper Missouri or west of the Rockies. This did not prevent Astor from forming a new company for this special purpose, nor did it stop some Nor'Westers from joining him.
In 1808 Astor had offered the North West Company a one-third interest in his projected fur company, to engage in the trade of the Far West. The wintering partners rejected the offer. But in the spring of 1810, when Astor was shaping his plans, it was understood, according to one North West Company merchant, that Astor was "to be connected with the N W Company to make settlements on the North West coast of America, to communicate with the inland N W trade."2
There were advantages for both Astor and the Canadians in such a connection. If need be, Astor was financially able to risk $500,000 in western establishments; he had vessels to supply coastal outposts and supplement the Indian trade by provisioning, and exporting furs for the Russians; and he had free access to the China market.
The North West Company, on the other hand, was struggling for survival with the HBC in the Canadian Plains; it had no ships in western waters, and was excluded from the China trade. However, it had one important advantage over Astor--a foothold in the Rocky Mountain trade. Furthermore, anticipating that growing tensions between Britain and the United States would lead to war, the Canadians hoped that the British government would intervene by erecting a military establishment on the Pacific coast.
In January, 1811, two representatives of the leading mercantile houses of the North West Company were in New York to complete the organization of the South West Company. There, at the same time, Astor tentatively agreed with three former Nor'Westers to form the Pacific Fur Company. Thus Astor's plans for a large-scale operation, including a land and sea expedition to the Columbia, were known to the Canadians. When his sea expedition sailed in the fall of the year, the Canadians notified their London agent, Simon McGillivray, who wrote Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister:
. . . I fear it may almost be too late to accomplish the object which the North West Company had in view, if they could have obtained the Sanction of His Majesty's Government in sufficient time. That object was to establish Settlements on the Columbia River, and so to secure the right of Possession to Great Britain before the arrival of the Americans.
Still however this object might probably be accomplished His Majesty's right to the Territorial possession of the Northwest Coast of America preserved, if one of His Majesty's Ships could immediately be dispatched to take formal possession of land establish a Fort or Settlement in the Country. . . .
If the Plan which I have presumed to suggest should be adopted . . . the Northwest Comp would send an Expedition across the Continent to meet her, and to form trading Establishments under the protection of His Majesty's Fort; but unless they can obtain such protection, they cannot embark in their intended undertaking, and that Country and its Trade will be left to the possession of the Americans.3
The Nor'Westers were willing to gamble on their superior advantages and the possibility of war. Yet they were loath to jeopardize their position in the Pacific Northwest by a long and expensive trade war; nor could they ignore the possibility of having to cooperate with Astor if he became entrenched on the Columbia and the British government refused to help them.
One may therefore infer that in 1810-1811 the Canadians and Astor had a tacit agreement not to interfere with one another's trade. They may even have settled on spheres of interest in the New Northwest, as they had in the Old. This seems a reasonable explanation for Astor's venture, at an inauspicious time, into a situation of great risk. It must be kept in mind that Astor hated to lose money, and that he was not naive, though he sometimes pretended to be.
Astor's Pacific Fur was a joint-stock company. Of 100 shares of stock, Astor retained fifty, and thirty-five were assigned his partners. Fifteen shares were undistributed, but it was provided that when they were assigned, Astor would nominate four out of five three-share partnerships. Astor was to assume all risks for five years, with profits prorated among the partners. He was to have management of the concern for the first five years. Annual meetings of the partners were to be held at the Columbia River establishment and absent members were to vote by proxy. If the business proved unprofitable the company could be dissolved by majority vote at any annual meeting.
Five of Astor's nine partners had only recently severed connections with the North West Company. Alexander McKay had been clerk with Alexander Mackenzie's expedition to the Pacific in 1793, and a longtime partner in the company. Donald McKenzie, a chronically discontented young clerk related to Sir Alexander, and with two brothers and several other relatives associated with the company, resigned from its service in 1808. David Stuart was a cousin of John Stuart, who was in charge of the company's posts in northern New Caledonia. David's nephew, Robert, was relatively a newcomer to the trade. Duncan McDougall was a veteran Nor'Wester.
The Canadian Ramsay Crooks and American Robert McClellan and Joseph Miller had been associated with Astor's interests in the Wisconsin trade. In 1807 they were trading out of St. Louis, probably with some backing from Astor. Wilson Price Hunt of New Jersey, a newcomer to St. Louis the same year, possibly was also associated with Astor before the Pacific Fur Company was organized.
There was nothing petty in Astor's assault on the Northwest. he sent two expeditions. One was to cross by land and locate sites for a chain of posts. Originally it was intended that Donald McKenzie should share party command with Hunt, but before the expedition left winter quarters on the Missouri Hunt was given full charge and carried Astor's proxy. Placing Hunt in charge of the expedition was unfortunate since McKenzie was more experienced.
A second party was dispatched by ship to open a coastal trade and set up trading houses on the Columbia. Duncan McDougall was in charge of the sea contingent and was to command the chief post on the Columbia when Hunt was absent trading with the Russians or delivering fur cargoes to China.
The Tonquin sailed from New York September 8, 1810, and after a two-week stop at the Hawaiian Islands, arrived at the Columbia on March 22, 1811. By every report, Captain Jonathan Thorn, was a martinet. Determined to enter the river despite a heavy sea, he ordered the chief mate and four men, none seaman, to sound the channel. The whale boat and its crew disappeared in the waves. Three more attempts were made and three more men lost--a sacrifice of eight lives, attributed as much to Thorn's unreasoning stubbornness as to the hazards of the Columbia bar--before the Tonquin crossed it.
Having surveyed the shores, McDougall chose Point George on the south bank for the site of Fort Astoria, and the men set about building their shelters. In the first week of June, the Tonquin left the river for summer trading along the north coast. There being no place as yet to store trading goods, the greater part of the year's supply remained in the ship's hold.
In August, Indians reported that the ship had been destroyed and the crew massacred. Actual details of what happened will never be known; but it would appear that Thorn antagonized the natives, whose reputation for treachery was widespread, and failed to take proper precautions against them. Nootka sound is usually assumed to be the site of the disaster. However, it is more probable that the massacre took place at Newettee Harbor on the northern tip of Vancouver Island. Within six months the Astorians had suffered an appalling loss of life; eight men in entering the Columbia; at least twenty-seven with the Tonquin. The land party lost only two men, but it had other misfortunes.
At St. Louis early in September, 1810, Hunt was "preparing to proceed up the Missouri and prosue [sic] my trail to the Columbia." So reported General William Clark. But it was June 12 the following year when sixty-two men and the native wife of Pierre Dorion and their two children reached Council Bluffs, where reports of Indian hostilities on the upper river led Hunt to abandon boats, buy horses, and strike off across the Plains.4
The route lay generally to the southwest, and for some days the party traversed prairies of knee-deep grass. They followed the Big Horn to the wind River, crossed its beautiful valley and reached the Grand Teton Range by an Indian road. Guided by three trappers who had been with Andrew Henry the previous winter, Hunt and his companions had no trouble reaching the Green River where they "were surrounded by mountains in which were disclosed beautiful green valleys where numerous herds of bison graze. . ." Two weeks later, in a flurry of snow, they arrived at Andrew Henry's fort on the north fork of the Snake. Assuming the river to be navigable, they spent precious time making canoes, then embarked. Ten grueling days of portages, cordelling, and hazardous canoeing took them the amazing distance of 360 miles with the loss of only one man.
At Caldron Linn, the awesome character of the Snake was revealed. On October 29, from a precipitous cliff, Hunt looked down upon the river "full of rapids and intersected by falls from ten to forty feet high." but from where he stood, Hunt glimpsed only the crests of these falls: Shoshone 212 feet high, and Twin Falls, 182 feet. The men abandoned their canoes.
The Season was advancing, and the party still far from its destination. Supplies were exhausted, game was scarce, and the few Indians encountered were also short of food. Hunt sent Donald McKenzie and four men to the north in the hope of striking the main stream of the Columbia, while Robert McClellan and three men pushed ahead down the Snake Canyon.
Having cached their goods and distributed the scanty food supplies, the expedition divided. Hunt's party, with Dorion's wife and children, kept to the left bank of the river; Crooks and his men tried the right bank. From the ninth of November until the sixth of December the two parties hugged opposite walls of the canyon parallel to, but out of touch with, one another. Two weeks later, starving and exhausted, they remet. Crooks, to ill to travel, was left behind with John Day and a voyageur, the three to make their way as best they could. Hunt and the others, leaving the "accursed Mad River" reached the lovely valley of the Grande Ronde on December 30. Here in the cold morning hours, Dorion's wife gave birth to a child. A week later in the Blue Mountains, the baby died.
On January 15, they came to the Umatilla River and friendly natives. A month's journey later (February, 1811) at Fort Astoria, Hunt found McKenzie, McClellan, and John Reed, from whom he had parted at Caldron Linn. Crooks and John Day, destitute even of clothing and having suffered terrible want and abuse from Indians, arrived on May 11.
While the overland party was enduring these miseries, the men at Astoria faced troubles of another kind. McDougall was a poor leader in a situation calling for energy and firmness. Elementary health rules were ignored, and little was done to guard the men against diseases carried by Indian women. Attempts at discipline roused threats of mutiny. The loss of the Tonquin had reduced the Astorian's trading stock, and there were repeated rumors of Indian uprising. Not until early July (1811) was it considered safe for David Stuart and a small party to set off up the Columbia on a trading expedition.
Stuart had not yet left when the Astorians had a surprise visit from David Thompson, on his long-anticipated exploration of the Columbia.
The North West Company, meeting at Fort William in the summer of 1810 and hearing details of Astor's project, concluded it must show its hand on the Columbia River, but without a display of hostility. Thompson was ordered back to the mountains. Forced by Indian troubles to seek a new route, he crossed the Rockies by Athabaska Pass, ascended to his post at the Columbia headwaters, and by way of the Kootenai, Clark's Fork, and the Pend Oreille, reached Spokane House. From there he proceeded to the falls of the Columbia (Kettle Falls) where his men built a large canoe. On July 3, 1811, Thompson set out with seven men, "by the Grace of God . . . on a voyage down the Columbia River to explore this river in order to open out a passage for the interior trade with the Pacific Ocean."5
At the mouth of the Snake, Thompson put up a notice which read:
Know hereby that this country is claimed by Great Britain as part of its territories, and that the N.W. Company of Merchants from Canada, finding the factory for this people inconvenient for them, do hereby intend to erect a factory in this place for the commerce of the country around.
The next day Indians told him that a ship had arrived four months before. This was no surprise to Thompson, but his appearance at Fort Astoria five days later was indeed a surprise to the Astorians.
After a week's rest, during which he examined the river's entrance, Thompson left Astoria to return to the mountains. With him went David Stuart and eight Astorians who were to establish a trading post "somewhere below the Falls of the Columbia." At Celilo Falls Thompson pushed ahead of the rest and arrived at Spokane House on August 13. Stuart's slower-paced party reached the confluence of the Okanogan and Columbia rivers and there built Fort Okanogan. That Thompson was "cooperating' with the Astorians seems apparent. He knew the river; the Astorians did not. He must, therefore, have advised them as to the best sit for a post.
On his final trip on the Columbia, Thompson followed the full course of the river from its mouth to the source he had discovered four years earlier. He is remembered primarily as its explorer. But, contrary to long-accepted belief, he had not raced to the sea to get ahead of the Astorians. His mission was to study the feasibility of using the river as a waterway for the company's interior trade. Whether this trade would be in cooperation with Astor was decided in the spring of 1812, when the United States and Britain went to war.
Thompson was at Fort William for the annual meeting in the summer of 1812 when the proprietors decided to use the opportunity provided by war to oppose Astor. Donald McTavish was dispatched to England to arrange for a supply ship and convoy to come to the Columbia as quickly as possible. John Stuart, in charge of New Caledonia, was directed to join his operations with those of Thompson and to meet McTavish's ship at the mouth of the Columbia the following spring.
Meanwhile, the Astorian's spirits rose when Hunt and his party straggled in, early in the spring of 1812, and when, several months later, the Beaver dropped anchor with trading goods and additional personnel. They were encouraged, too, by returns from Stuart's upper Columbia expedition. Stuart had left Alexander Ross in command of Fort Okanogan and had set up a new post, later known as Kamloops House, on the Thompson River. Returning to Astoria in the spring of 1812, Stuart brought evidence of rich trade possibilities in the northern interior.
At the partners' spring meeting, Donald McKenzie was assigned to lead a trapping expedition in the Snake River country, and John Clarke to establish a post near the North West's Spokane House. Robert Stuart was to carry reports to Astor overland, and Hunt was to conduct company business with the Russians.
Despite this flurry of energetic planning, two of the men, Ramsay Crooks and Robert McClellan, gave up their partnerships to return with Stuart to St. Louis, even though this meant repeating a journey they had barely survived a few months before. Their course led them to the Green River and through South Pass to the North Platte River, the route subsequently followed by mountain men and immigrant settlers. Although Andrew Henry's trappers had probably crossed South Pass, Stuart's party was the first of record to use this now famous gateway to the Oregon country. With some difficulty, they reached St. Louis at the end of April, 1813, to find the United States at war with Great Britain.
Because of the war, and perhaps through unwillingness to risk a vessel on British-controlled sea lanes, Astor did not send out a supply ship in 1812. This put Hunt in a predicament. Leaving Fort Astoria that August, he had delivered to the Russians $56,000 worth of goods, receiving in exchange furs which he was to sell in China. Instead of returning to Astoria to pick up the Astorians' fur packs, Hunt proceeded to the Hawaiian Islands where, having sent the Beaver on to Canton to take advantage of a favorable market, he awaited vainly the arrival of the supply ship. In the end he had to purchase a vessel to get back to the fort.
Meanwhile, in January, 1813, the Astorians learned of the war, and of the expected arrival in the Columbia of a Nor'Westers' ship, the Isaac Todd, from England. When the vessel arrived, the Nor'Westers would have the advantage in trading stock, which was crushing news to the Astorians.
But the Isaac Todd was delayed: Nor'Westers and Astorians were now equally embarrassed by lack of trading goods. The Astorians decided to abandon their enterprise and to dissolve the company, as their agreement with Astor empowered them to do, but for the winter to divide their trade with the Nor'Westers. For the record, they explained:
The Ship Beaver was to have returned at the end of two months. Eleven months are now elapsed since she set sail. we have had no tidings of her since, and we have every reason to conclude that she must have either perished or taken her final departure from the coast. Another vessel was to have sailed about the usual time for our support, but after every due allowance, we need no longer expect her. We are now destitute of the necessary supplies to carry on the Trade, and we have no hopes of receiving more. We are yet entirely ignorant of the coast, on which we always had great dependence. The interior parts of the country turn out far short of our expectations. Its yearly produce in furs is very far from being equal to the expences the trade incurs, much less will it be able to recover the losses already sustained, or stand against a powerful opposition and support itself. In fine, circumstances are against us on every hand, and nothing operates to lead us into a conclusion that we can succeed.6
When Wilson Hunt, having finally procured a ship in Hawaii, reached Fort Astoria on August 20, he reluctantly agreed to the partner's decision, and turned again immediately for the Islands, this time to charter a vessel for removal of the Astorians and their stock. A few weeks later the Astorians learned that the Isaac Todd, whose arrival was expected at any moment, was accompanied by a frigate to seize the American establishment.
Astor's erstwhile partners now faced a new dilemma. All that remained of their venture was a limited supply of trading goods and a stock of furs. Nothing could be salvaged if the post were captured. So Duncan McDougall, on behalf of himself and his associates, Donald McKenzie, David Stuart, and John Clarke, agreed to sell to the Nor'Westers "the whole of their Establishments Furs and present stock . . . on the Columbia and Thompson Rivers."
No price had yet been agreed upon when, at the end of November, 1813, the British naval sloop Raccoon arrived to fulfill "a duty to the North West Company." Captain Black took possession of the post, renamed it Fort George, and left it in possession of the North West Company. Taking possession was an act of war which brought Fort Astoria into the peace negotiations that concluded the war.
So another surprise awaited Hunt on his return to Astoria in February, 1814. The month of March was spent in bitter disputes between Astorians and Nor'Westers over inventories and prices, but the terms of sale were finally set. On April 4, the North West's brigade set out for Montreal, taking along those Astorians who wanted to leave at once. Alexander Ross, Ross Cox, Duncan McDougall, and several voyageurs chose to stay on as employees of the North West Company.
Hunt and three clerks, one of whom was Russell Farnham, proceeded in the Pedlar to Sitka, Alaska, where they met Astor's vessel, Forester, whose captain had not dared to enter the Columbia after learning that the post had been captured. Farnham transferred to the Forester and was taken to the coast of Kamchatka. From there he crossed Siberia to St. Petersburg and proceeded to Copenhagen and London. In 1816 or 1817, he arrived in New York. This formidable journey was for the sole purpose of getting a more favorable price on the bill of exchange for $40,000 with which the Nor'Westers paid for the Astorian's furs.
Astor figured a loss of close to $160,000. He insisted that the true worth of the furs was two and a half times what he had received for them and that the trading goods were sold at only one-third of their value. The North West Company made no objection to the terms by which Astor had been bought out, competition removed, and their posts supplied, though the proprietors noted that, by the manner in which the bills of credit had been drawn, they lost at least 3000 pounds "owing to the rate of Exchange between Canada & England."
Astor at first blamed the war for his losses. Later he nursed the idea that he had been sold out by disloyal partners. This was not true. Astor had elected to take a large risk by competing with the Nor'Westers when war was imminent. His post was insufficiently supplied and mismanaged; the sale made the best of a bad situation. Had the Isaac Todd come when expected, the Nor'Westers would have held a compelling advantage over the Astorians and could have forced them out of the field with total loss. Failure of the ship to appear strengthened the bargaining power of the Astorians.
That Astor should be disappointed, even angered, by the failure of his company was natural. It appears, however, that his anger was directed at the Nor'Westers, over the low price paid for his stock. "While I breath[e] & so long as I have a dollar to spend I'll pursue a course to have our injuries repair'd & when I am no more I hope you'll act in my place; we have been sold, but I do not despond." he wrote Donald McKenzie in 1814. There seems to be no evidence that he blamed any of his associates for what happened, although he later cooled notably toward McKenzie, who had had little to do with the sale.
It may console those who consider Astor's loss a patriotic sacrifice to know that he actually suffered very little. The Treaty of Ghent reversed the decisions of the battlefield in the Old Northwest. Astor maintained his friendly relations with the Canadians, helping them circumvent trading regulations of the United States. In 1832, his American Fur Company, under the direction of Ramsay Crooks, captured the trade of the Missouri, and two years later, of the Rockies as well. Although Astor did not live to enjoy a complete personal triumph, the American Fur Company achieved his goal--mastery of the trade of the mountains and the plains.
From 1814 to 1821, Nor'Westers controlled the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest. But the Montreal merchants' anticipations of making Fort George a major post in their continental trade were not realized. Like Astor, they had planned that the Columbia River post should be the principle depot for the trade west of the Rockies. Ships arriving annually from London would not only supply the trade of the interior, but would carry furs directly to the China market. However, the East India Company refused to allow North West Company ships to carry Chinese goods to England, and lacking this lucrative link in the trade, it was unprofitable to supply Fort George from London. In 1815, the company had to contract with Boston merchants to do its carrying.
Neither economy nor energy distinguished the administration of Fort George. Donald McTavish, the first governor, arrived on the long-awaited Isaac Todd, well fortified with luxuries, including a lively barmaid from Portsmouth, to compensate for an anticipated dreary exile on the Columbia. The presence of Jane Barnes complicated the internal affairs of the colony and created troubles with the Indians. Shortly after their arrival, McTavish drowned and Jane was shipped back to England via Canton.
In the view of a sharp-tongued critic writing in 1824, Fort George was "a large pile of buildings covering about an acre of ground . . . [with] an appearance of Grandeur and consequence . . . not at all suitable to an Indian Trading Post." Everything was "on too extended a scale except the Trade."7 But to the men wintering under leaky roofs with its palisaded walls, their only contact with the outside world the annual express from Fort William and the supply ship, the fort was far from grand and life was dull, dreary, and lonely. The principle activities of some sixty-six men stationed there were hacking down luxuriant growth of brush that encroached upon their garden, packing furs for shipment, and preparing and distributing goods for the interior posts--Fort Okanogan, Spokane House, Kamloops, Kootenay House, Fort Alexander, and Fort Nez Perce (Walla Walla).
In 1816 Donald McKenzie was sent back to the Columbia to take charge of the interior trade. The Astorians had not fully appreciated his talents, for he proved to be one of the North West Company's most successful traders and explorers. A man of huge stature, weighing over 300 pounds; tireless, fearless, and a skilled rifleman able to "drive a dozen balls consecutively at one hundred paces through a Spanish dollar," he was feared and respected by the natives. In four years he made three expeditions into the rugged Snake Country.
In 1818 McKenzie built Fort Nez Perce as a trade center for the Nez Perce Indians and a supply depot for the vast area in which he explored and trapped. In 1819 he ascended the Snake River from the Clearwater to the Burnt River in a bateau, a feat not duplicated until modern times, and then with engine-powered craft. He initiated the trapping expedition, using company men as trappers instead of relying wholly on trade with the Indians. In his first outfit he took 55 men, 195 horses, 300 beaver traps, and a stock of merchandise, but no provisions, since he lived off the country. One hundred and fifty-four pack horses were needed to bring out his furs. In 1820-1821 he went out with seventy-five trappers, and returned without the loss of a man.
McKenzie embodied the dynamic enterprise which had once characterized the Nor'Westers as lords of the lakes and the forests in the Old Northwest and in the Canadian Plains, but he was frustrated by the apathy of his associates in the new Northwest. Enterprise was not a general characteristic of Nor'Westers at Fort George, but the days of the North West Company on the Columbia were numbered.
1Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor, 2 vols. (1931).
2Wisconsin Historical Collection, XIX, 336-337.
3Arthur S. Morton, "Notes and Documents: The Appeal of the North West Company to the British Government . . .," Canadian Historical Review, September 1936, 310-311.
4The Discovery of the Oregon Trail: Robert Stuart's Narratives of His Overland Trip . . . an Account of the Tonquin's Voyage . . . and Wilson Price Hunt's Diary . . ., Philip a Rollins, ed. (1935).
5"Journal of David Thompson," T.C. Elliott, ed., OHQ, March 1914, 57.
6T.C. Elliott, "Sale of Astoria, 1813," OHQ, March 1932, 45.
7Frederick Merk, Fur Trade and Empire (1931), 65; New Light on the Early History of the Greater North West; The Manuscript Journals of Alexander Henry and David Thompson . . ., Elliott Coues, ed., 3 vols. (1897); Alexander Ross, Adventures of the First Settlers . . .; The Fur Hunters of the Far West, Kenneth A. Spalding, ed. (1956); and Ross Cox, The Columbia River . . ., E.I. and J.R. Stewart, eds. (1957).